481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. 618, 829 S.E.2d 820 (2019). 16-8-41(a) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. Convicted felon's conviction for possession of a shotgun was authorized, even though the shotgun was not in the felon's immediate possession, where the evidence supported a finding that the felon was a party to the crime of burglary and the felon and codefendant were co-conspirators. S09C0986, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 341 (Ga. 2009). 21-6304. - Because the defendant had completed a three-year first-offender probationary sentence and had been discharged without court adjudication of guilt pursuant to O.C.G.A. A federal jury found a Springfield man guilty last week for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a two-day trial at Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 818 S.E.2d 622 (2018). Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 299 S.E.2d 707 (1983). Smallwood v. State, 166 Ga. App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (2008). Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. Little v. State, 195 Ga. App. Defense counsel was not ineffective under Ga. Const. Mar. denied, No. 16-11-131) was only an additional qualification to requirements presently provided in former Code 1933, 26-2904 (see now O.C.G.A. - For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. Despite the trial court's abuse of discretion in rejecting the defendant's offer to stipulate to a prior conviction for aggravated child molestation, that error was harmless as it was undisputed that the defendant was a convicted felon, admitted to possessing the firearm, and failed to give any justification for possession or offer any evidence of a legal reason to do so. Fed. For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. The District Attorneys Office Ziegler v. State, 270 Ga. App. - Evidence supported the defendant's contention that the defendant shot the victim in self-defense; therefore, if the defendant's possession of a firearm at the shooting was justified under the rule created under O.C.G.A. A person who has been convicted under federal or state law of a felony pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, or restraint of trade shall, upon presenting to the Board of Public Safety proof, and it being established from said proof, submitted by the applicant to the satisfaction of the Board of Public Safety that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant's record and reputation are such that the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, or possession of firearms by the person would not present a threat to the safety of the citizens of Georgia and that the granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest, be granted relief from the disabilities imposed by this Code section. Possession of Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007). The US Supreme Court on Monday limited new trials for felons convicted for being in possession of a firearm, limiting the retroactive application of its 2019 decision Rehaif v. United States. Evidence that handguns belonging to a passenger in a defendant's car, that the handguns were within an arm's reach of the defendant during the commission of felony drug offenses, that the defendant knew that the passenger carried guns for protection while in the drug trade in which the defendant actively participated, and that the defendant was a first offender probationer was sufficient to show that the defendant jointly and constructively possessed the handguns in violation of O.C.G.A. 16-11-131, and introduction of evidence of such previous conviction during trial of issue of guilt is not error. Rev. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Scott v. State, 276 Ga. 195, 576 S.E.2d 860 (2003); Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003). 1983, Art. 783, 653 S.E.2d 107 (2007). (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) Felony means this Section, Chapter 11 - Offenses Against Public Order and Safety, Article 4 - Dangerous Instrumentalities and Practices, Part 3 - Carrying and Possession of Firearms. Disclaimer: These codes may not be the most recent version. 163, 290 S.E.2d 159 (1982). The evidence at trial on the malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime charges was sufficient and was incorporated by reference into the trial on the firearm count. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). U80-32. Since the defendant's first-offender probation expired prior to the date on which the defendant was alleged to have possessed a firearm and the state presented no evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm during the term of probation and prior to the defendant's discharge, the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer had to be reversed. - Conviction was reversed in part because while the defendant knew the location of the shotgun, there was no evidence presented that the defendant had actual possession of the shotgun outside of possibly handing the shotgun to officers at the officers' request, nor was there evidence that the defendant was in constructive possession of the shotgun in violation of O.C.G.A. Fed. Webprobationers are generally forbidden to possess firearms, and if a convicted felon or felony first-offender probationer unlawfully possesses a firearm, he commits a felony. 3d Art. 16-11-131 provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that a conviction by an out-of-state court of a crime, which authorized punishment of up to three years in prison, is a felony conviction for purposes of the statute. 370, 358 S.E.2d 912 (1987). Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 538, 832 S.E.2d 402 (2019). V (see now Ga. Const. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003). 16-11-131(b), indicated that the quantity of firearms was inconsequential and that the gravamen of the offense was the general receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms by convicted felons, rather than the specific quantity of firearms received, possessed, or transported and, therefore, the statute unambiguously permitted only one conviction for simultaneous possession of any number of firearms. State v. Santerfeit, 163 Ga. App. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 3d Art. 17-10-7, when the state had already used that conviction in support of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant failed to object at sentencing to the exhibit containing the conviction. Strawder v. State, 207 Ga. App. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by evidence that the defendant was present in the apartment above the defendant's mother's garage, had access to the garage at any time, and was present in the apartment almost every time probation officers visited, allowing the jury to find the defendant had access, power, and intention to exercise dominion or control over the firearm found in the apartment. When there was no evidence that a pistol was not a firearm, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the pistol was such beyond a reasonable doubt. IV, 1, would not prohibit according defendant's misdemeanor conviction felony status. 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. 770, 728 S.E.2d 286 (2012). Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. 901, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989). Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 16-11-131, the failure to correctly list a conviction as forgery in the first degree, instead of forgery, did not result in a variance between the indictment and proof offered at the trial so as to affect defendant's substantial rights. Defendant's possession of a handgun when the defendant shot the victim on July 29, 2012, was not simultaneous with the defendant's possession of the long guns on August 2, 2012, when the defendant carried them from the house and hid them in the overgrown area of the backyard; thus, those convictions did not merge. Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 16-11-131 is a reasonable regulation authorized by the police power and thus is not violative of Ga. Const. McTaggart v. State, 285 Ga. App. 657, 350 S.E.2d 302 (1986). Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. 16-11-131(b) because the defendant's bedroom contained two firearms and ammunition for a third gun that was found in a spare bedroom, and a shed the defendant used also contained ammunition for the guns. O.C.G.A. Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, "18 U.S.C. Adkins v. State, 164 Ga. App. If you are convicted, you will face up to 10 years in 215, 522 S.E.2d 506 (1999); Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 296, 283 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. .030 Defacing a firearm. Absent a pardon, such an applicant commits a felony under O.C.G.A. Att'y Gen. No. 16-11-131. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. The good news is that you have options. 16-11-131, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the definitions of constructive and joint possession to enable the jury to consider whether defendant "possessed" the weapon within the meaning of that section. - Unit of prosecution under O.C.G.A. 16-3-24.2. - Police search of a defendant's bag and person, which produced handguns, cocaine, cash, and other drugs was lawful because the search was made pursuant to the police officers' lawful warrantless arrest of the defendant when the defendant arrived at a motel room exactly answering a detailed description provided by a confidential informant, who stated that the defendant would be carrying a shoulder bag containing drugs and a loaded handgun. Construction with O.C.G.A. 16-3-21 and16-11-138, then it could not be said that the defendant was committing a felony when the defendant shot the victim, and the preclusive bar of 16-3-21(b)(2) would not apply. 16-11-131 was tantamount to a directed verdict, requiring reversal. Fed. Charles Randy Payton Lewis, 29, was arrested in September 2022 and 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (2002); Reece v. State, 257 Ga. App. Scott v. State, 250 Ga. 195, 297 S.E.2d 18 (1982). Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, possessing a firearm during the commission of that murder, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. 3. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. Rev. Evidence that defendant kept guns in storage in safes immediately after defendant was released from prison on parole after defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and firing a gun at another was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer. 2d 122 (2008). of That misdemeanor has been replaced with a new misdemeanor of carrying a weapon without being a lawful weapons carrier (and the same felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted After the appellant was found guilty of criminal damage to property, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, evidence of the appellant's prior felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter was clearly admissible since the state's evidence proving the appellant's prior conviction contained references not only to voluntary manslaughter, as alleged in the indictment, but also to charges of murder and aggravated assault. - Trial court had no obligation to bifurcate a trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from other unrelated charges in the same indictment where defendant made no motion to bifurcate. 764, 315 S.E.2d 257 (1984). 0:02. Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. - Defendant voluntarily consented to police officers searching the defendant's bedroom; moreover, the officers did not threaten defendant into giving defendant's consent merely by telling defendant that they could obtain a warrant based on their earlier seizure of marijuana in another part of the house. 6. Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as defendant's possession of the victim's handgun and shotgun on the night of the crimes was shown by the victim's direct testimony, rather than by circumstantial evidence, since: (1) the victim testified that two men forced their way into the victim's house, hit the victim in the head with a blunt object, recovered a .380 caliber handgun and a 20-gauge single-barrel shotgun, forced the victim to give them thousands of dollars the victim had hidden in the attic, and then fled; (2) during a consensual search, the police found a .380 caliber handgun hidden in the defendant's bedroom that was identified as the victim's by the victim and that bore the same serial number as the victim's gun; and (3) the victim identified defendant in a photo array and at trial; thus, the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant was in actual possession of the handgun and that defendant continued to be in at least constructive possession of the handgun when the handgun was found in defendant's bedroom. Extradition Treaties Between United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - United States and United Kingdom Cases, 45 A.L.R. Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 608, 722 S.E.2d 351 (2012). 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (2007). 16-11-131(b) merely based on circumstantial evidence that failed, in violation of former O.C.G.A. 2d 50 (2007). Admission of a certified copy of defendant's five-year sentence for a prior conviction of armed robbery showing both that defendant had pled guilty to armed robbery and that defendant had been represented by counsel satisfied the requirement of O.C.G.A. 324(a), 44 A.L.R. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007). Robinson v. State, 281 Ga. App. After verdicts were entered on the other counts charged against the defendant, evidence submitted by the state consisting of a certified copy of the defendant's prior conviction showing the defendant's probationary status as a first time offender for felony theft by taking at the time of the crimes was sufficient to support a conviction under O.C.G.A. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. - State Board of Pardons and Paroles has authority to restore, in a pardon to a Georgian convicted of a felony, the right to receive, possess or transport in commerce a firearm, so long as the pardon expressly uses wording which appears in 18 U.S.C. - In a case in which the evidence showed that defendant, a convicted felon, used a firearm to shoot the deceased, a trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the indictment under O.C.G.A. 42, 520 S.E.2d 746 (1999); Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. - CRIMES AGAINST THE PUBLIC SAFETY. 178, 786 S.E.2d 558 (2016). The arrest was made without a warrant or probable cause. 84, 812 S.E.2d 353 (2018), aff'd, 306 Ga. 111, 829 S.E.2d 376 (2019). Thompson v. State, 168 Ga. App. - Trial court erred in admitting into evidence over objection a fingerprint card taken following a felony arrest of defendant for violation of, inter alia, O.C.G.A. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 16-11-131 or in refusing to charge sudden emergency, specific intent, or O.C.G.A. 899, 379 S.E.2d 199 (1989); Clark v. State, 206 Ga. App. 16-11-129(b)(3). - To support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the state need only prove that the accused is a convicted felon and in possession of a firearm as defined in O.C.G.A. Gun possession may be restricted based on various factors, including: Age/Type of Gun: Federal law prohibits the sale of a handgun to anyone under age 18. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Marshall v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020). - Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Crime Information Center Council, 140-2-.17. 16-11-131 where a victim testified to seeing the weapon emerge from the window of defendant's truck, and then saw the muzzle flash. 372, 626 S.E.2d 567 (2006). 16-11-131, insufficiency in the proof of this element demands entry of a judgment of acquittal as to that offense; thus, since the Court of Appeals determined that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant was a convicted felon, it was error for that court to remand the case for a hearing on the sole issue of whether the defendant had in fact pled guilty to any prior charges. 280, 390 S.E.2d 425 (1990). 2d 74 (1992); Holcomb v. State, 231 Ga. App. Because Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule, and despite the fact that the jury found that the defendant did not commit armed robbery, this did not preclude the trial judge from finding the defendant guilty of possessing a firearm while a convicted felon given evidence that: (1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon was not contested; and (2) the defendant was in constructive possession of the firearm used by another to commit the crimes charged and conspired to possess the firearm as a party to the crime. - Propriety of using single prior felony conviction as basis for offense of possessing weapon by convicted felon and to enhance sentence, 37 A.L.R.4th 1168. With regard to a defendant's conviction on two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict based on the defendant's contention that a prior out-of-state conviction was not a felony conviction; given that the defendant was convicted of an offense that carried a maximum punishment of three years in prison, the trier of fact properly concluded that the defendant had been convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more, pursuant to O.C.G.A. Web(b) If a felon is convicted of a criminal offense other than possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he or she possessed a firearm in commission of that offense, then the felon shall be penalized for violating this section one (1) class more severely if it is a second or subsequent violation of this section. 309, 827 S.E.2d 733 (2019); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. Web10.15 (a) Possession Of [A Firearm] [An Electric Weapon or Device] [Ammunition] [Or] [Carrying a Concealed Weapon] by a Person Under the Age of 24 Who Has Been Found Delinquent of an Offense that would be a Felony if Committed by an Adult 790.23 (1) (b) or (1) (d), Fla. Stat. WebAny person prohibited from possessing, transporting, or carrying a firearm, ammunition for a firearm, or a stun weapon under subsection A may petition the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which he resides or, if the person is not a resident of the Commonwealth, the circuit court of any county or city where such person was last convicted of a Hightower v. State, 278 Ga. 39, 597 S.E.2d 362 (2004). 310, 520 S.E.2d 466 (1999). 17-10-7. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google, There is a newer version of the Georgia Code, CHAPTER 11 - OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, ARTICLE 4 - DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES AND PRACTICES, PART 3 - CARRYING AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. 735, 691 S.E.2d 626 (2010). What amounts to "control" under state statute making it illegal for felon to have possession or control of firearm or other dangerous weapon, 66 A.L.R.4th 1240. In Texas, it is illegal for any person convicted of a felony to possess a gun or ammunition. 10.16 Using a Firearm While under the Influence 790.151, Fla. Stat. 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told the witnesses that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. 153, 630 S.E.2d 661 (2006). 172, 523 S.E.2d 31 (1999). 1203(2). - Evidence that the defendant was found in possession of two black powder guns was sufficient to support the convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and by a convicted felon. 347. 313, 744 S.E.2d 833 (2013). 16-11-126(c), which concerns carrying a concealed weapon. Article 63. 0:57. denied, 193 Ga. App. Have you recently been arrested for possession of a firearm in Texas? Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions since the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim's positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim's subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant's hands as a sergeant regularly ordered gunshot residue tests on suspects. Const., amend. 247, 304 S.E.2d 95 (1983); McGee v. State, 173 Ga. App. 16-11-131, the trial court properly dismissed the charge. - Trial court erred in failing to merge, for purposes of sentencing, the defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with use of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony, because the same act was used to establish each of the offenses and each crime did not require proof of a fact not required by the other. Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the gun being found in close physical proximity to the defendant and that the defendant had in a pocket the exact number of the proper caliber bullets to completely reload the gun; although others had access to the car before the defendant took possession of the car, the evidence authorized the conclusion that the car had been visually inspected at a point close in time to when the defendant had sole access. Fact that weapon was acquired for self-defense or to prevent its use against defendant as defense in prosecution for violation of state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 967. - Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction.